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Excessive Entanglement: Development of a
Guideline For Assessing Acceptable
Church-State Relationships
JAMES M. ZOETEWEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The latest Supreme Court decision in Meek v. Pittenger1 reaf-
firms recent separationist and accommodationist decisions. To be
sure, the Court has more strongly asserted the separationist than
the accommodationist 2 stance. The separationist bent was mani-
fested in Meek by the Court's overturning of two Pennsylvania Acts
providing auxiliary services to nonpublic school children and loan-
ing instructional materials and equipment useful for the education
of nonpublic schoolchildren. Both Acts were regarded as violations
* Associate Professor & Chairman, Political Science Department,
Hope College; A.B. (Education), Calvin College, 1960; Ph.D. (Political
Science), University of Colorado, 1971.
This article was made possible by a 1975 Summer Seminar stipend
from the National Endowment for the Humanities held at the University
of Virginia on the topic of the Supreme Court and civil rights and
liberties.
1. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
2. For characterizations of separationism and accommodationism, see
H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CiviL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 253-57, 262-71 (2d ed. 1972).
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because pre-
dominantly church-related schools benefited from the Acts. Al-
though the ban on auxiliary services and materials was consider-
ably broader than any Court majority had enunciated in the past,
the decision did not constitute a shift in the Supreme Court's posi-
tion on aid to elementary and secondary nonpublic education.
3
These invalidations again contributed to "dashed legislative expec-
tations... in the area of aid to church-related elementary and sec-
ondary schools"'4 and confirmed the strict separationist attitude
taken by the Court since 1971 in its Lemon, Levitt, Nyquist, and
Sloan decisions. 5
The court further fixed the narrow province of accommodation
by upholding the textbook loan provision of one of the two Acts,
concluding that the textbook loans were constitutional because they
were identical to the loan program approved in Board of Education
v. Allen.6
Meek v. Pittenger demonstrated at least three features that
presently characterize the disposition and posture of the Court as
it seeks to draw the line in parochiaid decisions. First, Richard E.
Morgan noted that the disposition of the Court in Nyquist, Sloan,
and Hunt7 was three to three to three: an "accommodationist bloc"
(Justices White, Burger, and Rehnquist), a "super separationist
bloc" (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall), and a "moderately
separationst bloc" (Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart). The
moderate separationists accounted for the difference in result be-
tween Nyquist and Hunt.s This disposition was retained in Meek
and accounted for the difference in result between the textbook
loans decision and the auxiliary services and instructional materials
and equipment decision. Powell, Stewart, and Blackmum con-
tinued to be the swing votes.
Second, Norah C. McCann's analysis of the ramifications of the
Nyquist decision is still relevant for Meek:
The basic proposition which has emerged in the context of
public aid to elementary and secondary sectarian schools is that
3. New York Times, May 20, 1975, at 22, col. 2 (city ed.).
4. Wilson, The School Aid Decisions: A Chronicle of Dashed Expec-
tations, 3 J. LAW & ED. 101 (1974).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Relig. Lib., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Relig. Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973).
6. Board of Edue. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
7. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
8. Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final
Installment? 1973 S. CT. REv. 57, 88 (1974).
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any state aid which is necessary to their survival will amount to
state sponsorship of their religious character. It is for this reason
that the Court, through its tripartite Establishment Clause test,
looks not to the mechanics of the government aid, but rather to
the substantive impact of the aid upon the church-related institu-
tion. "A little aid is all right, but a lot is unconstitutional." 9
Third, the Court continued to adhere to the tripartite Establish-
ment Clause test which has been a fixture in assessing Establish-
ment Clause issues since the 1971 Lemon v. Kurtzman decision:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose...
Second, it must have a "primary effect" that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . . . Third, the statute and its administration
must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.10
The Court's Meek decision used the "primary effect" test to invali-
date the Pennsylvania loans of instructional materials and equip-
ment to sectarian schools and "excessive government entangle-
ment" test to void the auxiliary services benefits for children in
Pennsylvania's sectarian schools.
The primary object of this comment is to examine the signifi-
cance of one facet of the tripartite test, the excessive entanglement
test. Although it is not possible to completely dissect this rule from
the tripartite test, an effort will be made to examine the develop-
ment of excessive entanglement from Walz" through Meek, to de-
scribe its parameters, to assess its nature as a separate test, and to
discuss its interactions with the other two elements in the tripartite
test. The overall purpose is to examine the Supreme Court in its
efforts to draw lines in the delicate area of public aid to sectarian
schools.
II. WALZ v. TAX COMMISSION
The Walz or New York Tax Exemption Case concerned a legal
challenge to the actions of the New York City Tax Commission in
granting tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious
properties used solely for religious worship. Walz, a New York City
taxpayer, claimed that the tax exemption required him to indirectly
make a contribution to religious bodies and thereby violated the
9. Note, Parochial School Aid: A Public Perspective, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
104, 131-32 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Perspective].
10. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975).
11. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
First Amendment provision prohibiting an establishment of reli-
gion.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in his first
"church-state" opinion,12 examined the purposes of the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clauses. He stated that the framers of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment believed that the estab-
lishment of a religion "connoted sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activitiy."'13 He
noted that the Court had "struggled to find a neutral course be-
tween the two clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other."' 4 The Chief Justice concluded that the core
of the Religion Clauses was, and is, that "there is room for play in
the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without inter-
ference."15
In assessing the legitimacy of the tax exemption, Burger ex-
amined the legislative purpose and effect tests, subsumed under a
"legislative purpose" discussion, 16 and held that the New York
statute did not attempt to establish religion; it simply spared "the
exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on
private profit institutions."17  The Chief Justice further argued
that the grant of a tax exemption was not the same as a direct grant
and that it didn't comprise sponsorship of religion because the gov-
ernment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but sim-
ply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.' 8
-Chief Justice Burger's decision in Walz is important because of
the Court's fundamental alteration of the legislative purpose-pri-
mary effect test through the rather summary addition of a third Es-
tablishment Clause test, the excessive entanglement concept.19 The
12. Katz, Radiations from Church Tax Exemption, 1970 S. CT. REv. 93,
94 (1971).
13. 397 U.S. at 668.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 669.
16. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of
Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REv. 147, 155-56 (1972). Giannella
notes that Burger's opinion discussed both the purpose and effect tests,
but placed predominant reliance on the excessive entanglement concept.
17. 397 U.S. at 673.
18. Id. at 675.
19. See R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND REIGION, 103-07 (New
York Free Press, 1972); Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to Private Edu-
cation, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 253-54 (1975); Giannella, Lemon and Tilton:
The Bitter and the Sweet of Churh-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REv.
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Chief Justice's first use of the phrase occurred in his discussion of
the fact that an absolute separation of church and state is impossi-
ble, for "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involve-
ment of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive
entanglement. '20 In relating excessive entanglement to the tax
exemption, Burger noted the following:
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemptions is not
aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not
end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end
result-the effect--is not an excessive government entanglement
with religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Either
course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree
of involvement with religion. Elimination of exemptions would
tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and
the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of
these legal processes. 21
These two quotations suggest several features of the excessive en-
tanglement concept as it related to Walz and could be applied to
future cases: (1) the concept was tied to the tension between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; (2) the concept may ini-
tially have been regarded as an element in the "primary effect" test,
since the word "effect" is used in the second quotation; 22 (3) the
test is one of degree, because of the inescapable involvement be-
tween church and state; and (4) excessive government entangle-
ment with religion, including religio-government strife, would have
resulted if tax exemptions had been eliminated because of inevit-
able increases in government and church relationships in taxation.
As Burger suggests at another point, the exemption created only a
"minimal and remote involvement between church and state."23
147, 155, 158; Note, Government Assistance to Church-Sponsored Schools:
Tilton v. Richardson and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 113,
116-17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Assistance]; Katz, Radiations from
Church Tax Exemption, 1970 S. CT. REv. 93, 98 (1971).
20. 397 U.S. at 670.
21. Id. at 674.
22. It is also feasible to contend that the "excessive entanglement
standard of Walz was probably designed to replace the unsatisfactory
'purpose and effect' verbal formulation" which had left previous cases
with no lasting guideline other than the Court's judgment of affirmance
or reversal. See Lewin, Disentangling Myth from Reality, 3 J. LAW & ED.
107, 112 (1974).
23. 397 U.S. at 676.
The excessive entanglement concept has had considerable signifi-
cance as an independent concept within the tripartite test in subse-
quent cases. Lemon v. Kurtzman24 and Tilton v. Richardson 25
manifest the application of the entanglement test.
III. LEMON AND TILTON
In Lemon v. Kurtzman three cases were decided by the Supreme
Court in one opinion in May, 1971. The Lemon, Earley v. Di Censo,
and Robinson v. Di Censo26 cases tested Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes that allowed the states to assume a portion of the
expenses of nonpublic education. The Lemon case considered the
constitutionality of a 1968 Pennsylvania Law that allowed the state
to purchase27 secular educational services from nonpublic schools.
Under contracts authorized by the statute, the state directly reim-
bursed nonpublic schools for actual expenses for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials. Separate accounting proce-
dures subject to state audit were to be maintained by schools seek-
ing reimbursement. Reimbursement was limited to courses found
in public school curriculums; these included only the following sec-
ular subjects: mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical sci-
ence, and physical education. The State Superintendent of Public
Instruction had to approve textbooks and instructional materials.
No reimbursement could be made for any course containing "any
subject matter expressing religious teaching or the morals or forms
of worship of any sect. '' 28 The three-judge federal court that
heard the case held that the statute violated neither the Free Exer-
cise nor Establishment Clauses.29
The Di Censo case tested the constitutionality of a 1969 Rhode Is-
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. The purchase of secular educational services was necessary to
bypass a stringent provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution that forbade
appropriations to or use of public funds for the support of any sectarian
institution. Under the Pennsylvania law, the nonpublic schools, under a
purchase-sale arrangement, would make contracts with the state to sell
their secular educational services to the state and deliver these services
by teaching secular subjects to the children in their particular schools.
The services that were purchased were entirely secular and texts and
other instructional materials had to be approved by the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction. The purpose and effect was secular and
did not advance religion. See L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: THE COURT As REFEREE OF CHURCH-STATE CONFRONTATION, 276-77
(1975).
28. 403 U.S. at 609-10.
29. Id. at 611.
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land statute that authorized state officials to supplement the sala-
ries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools
by paying directly to a teacher an amount not exceeding fifteen per
cent of his annual salary. The teacher was required to hold a state
certificate, teach only those subjects offered in the public school
curriculum, use only teaching materials that were used in public
schools, and agree not to teach any religion courses. Eligible schools
were to submit financial data to the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion. Only Roman Catholic school teachers had qualified for the
salary supplements. The three-judge federal court that heard the
case concluded that the Act violated the Establishment Clause,
holding that it fostered excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion. Two judges also thought that the statute had
the impermissible effect of giving significant aid to a religious en-
terprise.8 0
Chief Justice Burger began by noting that the "line of demarca-
tion" under the Religion Clauses could only be "dimly perceived"
and that the language of the Religion Clauses were "at best
opaque."' 31 He said that every analysis of the Establishment
Clause must begin with examination of the "cumulative criteria"
developed by the Court over the years, in other words, the tripartite
test. The Chief Justice stated that the Court did not have to decide
whether the statutes properly met the principal purpose or primary
effect tests. He in effect declared the independent status of the ex-
cessive entanglement test by concluding that the cumulative impact
of the entire relationship arising under the statute of each state in-
volved an unconstitutional degree of excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion.32
Entanglement was to be determined by examination of three cri-
teria: (1) the character and purposes of the institutions which were
benefited, (2) the nature of the aid provided by the state, and (3)
30. Id. at 607-09. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and
Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REv. 147, 161 (1962), who
notes that the trial court equated excessive entanglement with the older
concept of undue involvement and used it to refer to all kinds of improper
relationships between church and state.
31. 403 U.S. at 612.
32. Id. at 613-14. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685 (1971),
Burger explicitly identified the excessive entanglement test as an "inde-
pendent measure of constitutionality under the Religious Clauses."
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority. 3 In assessing the significance of these criteria in the Di
Censo case, the Court noted that the parochial schools constituted
a vital part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church and that
the schools were powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic
faith to future generations. They involved, therefore, substantial
religious activity and purpose.8 4 The Court also stated that the po-
tential for impermissible fostering of religion was present, because
dedicated sectarian teachers of even secular subjects would find it
difficult to remain neutral.88  The state had to be certain that sub-
sidized teachers remained neutral and, therefore, carefully condi-
tioned its aid with pervasive restrictions. Burger noted that a
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"
would "inevitably" be required to ensure obedience to the restric-
tions and the First Amendment. Teachers, unlike books, could not
be inspected once regarding personal beliefs. The continuing sur-
veillance would involve excessive and enduring entanglement be-
tween state and church.36 Excessive entanglement could also be
engendered through the state inspections and evaluations that were
necessary to determine if specific schools met the criteria for state
subsidization of teachers.3 7
The allegations against the Pennsylvania statute were similar to
those raised concerning the Rhode Island statute. The church-re-
lated elementary and secondary schools were controlled by religious
organizations, they had the purpose of promoting a particular reli-
gious faith, and their operations were conducted to fulfill that pur-
pose. Excessive entanglement was also fostered by this statute be-
cause surveillance was necessary to ensure that teachers played a
strictly nonideological role and because the schools seeking reim-
bursement had to maintain state inspected accounting procedures
that separated secular from religious instruction.8 The Pennsyl-
vania statute had the further defect of providing direct financial aid
to the church-related schools. Everson39 and Allen,40 in contrast,
provided aid directly to the student and his parents. The Chief Jus-
tice warned that cash grants could lay a basis for later comprehen-
33. 403 U.S. at 615.
34. Id. at 616. The Court cited Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab-
lishment, and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 574 (1968), as
a key source for this assessment.
35. 403 U.S. at 618.
36. Id. at 619.
37. Id. at 620.
38. Id. at 620-21.
39. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
40. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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sive measures of surveillance and controls 41 and the government
post-audit power, especially, created an intimate and continuing re-
lationship between church and state.42
The Chief Justice introduced the concept of "political divisive-
ness" to explain a broader base for entanglement. Communities in
which a large number of pupils were served by church related
schools would also be focal points for considerable political activity.
The potential divisiveness of political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect.48 Burger distinguished Walz from Lemon
by stating:
But in Walz we dealt with a status under state tax laws for the
benefit of all religious groups. Here we are confronted with suc-
cessive and very likely permanent annual appropriations which
benefit relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and
divisiveness on religious lines is likely to be intensified.44
The Court noted that the deepening economic crisis of parochial
schools would inescapably mean greater pressures on government
for increased aid.45
The Chief Justice also linked the political divisiveness argument
closely to the "progression" argument which the Court introduced
in Walz. 46 In Walz, however, the Court said that the tax exemp-
tion was not the first step of an "inevitable progression leading to
the establishment of state churches and state religion." Tax ex-
41. This statement raises a question that Paul Kauper noted that the
Court did not mention, the state agency question. This argument stresses
that government institutions that accepted government assistance there-
fore assumed a public aspect and became subject to Fourteenth Amend-
ment limitations. This meant possibly more entanglement than that re-
sulting from public administrative surveillance of a grant to see whether
restrictions in the grant were observed. See Kauper, Public Aid to Paro-
chial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon, Di Censo, and Tilton
Cases, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 567, 589 (1971).
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 621-22.
43. Id. at 622. Burger cited Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
82 HAiv. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969), to bolster this point. Freund points out
that "while political debate and division is normally a wholesome process
for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is
one of the principal evils that the First Amendment sought to forestall."
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 623.
45. Id. at 623-24.
46. See Duffy, A Review of Supreme Court Decisions on Aid to Non-
public Elementary and Secondary Education, 23 HAST. L.J. 984 (1972).
emptions had stood the test of two hundred years without leading
to the establishment of religion.47 The progression argument was
more persuasive for the Court in Lemon because of the absence of
the lessons of history and because of the newness of the state pro-
grams. 48
Burger concluded by extolling the merits and deploring the eco-
nomic problems of parochial schools. These matters, however, were
not the issue. The "sole question" was "whether state aid to these
schools" could "be squared with the dictates of the Religion
Clauses." Burger's answer was as follows:
Under our system the choice has been made that government is
to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and
churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitu-
tion decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individ-
ual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that
while some involvement and entanglement is inevitable, lines
must be drawn. 49
The Chief Justice exercised further his propensity for line draw-
ing in a plurality opinion in Tilton v. Richardson," reported the
same day as Lemon. In a five to four decision the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the federal Higher Educational Facilities
Act of 1963 except for a portion of the act that provided for a
twenty year limitation on the religious use of the facilities built
with federal funds. The Act authorized federal grants and loans
to colleges and universities for the construction of a wide variety
of academic facilities. The act excluded funds for divinity schools
or facilities for sectarian instruction or religious worship. The
United States Commissioner of Education was responsible for ad-
ministering the Act and his office enforced the statutory restric-
tions, primarily by way of on-site inspections.
Four Catholic colleges and universities in Connecticut received
funds for library, science, and other buildings under the Act. Their
receipt of these grants was challenged in a three-judge federal dis-
trict court by Connecticut residents and by United States taxpayers
who contended that the four institutions were sectarian. The
schools introduced testimony to demonstrate their full compliance
with the statutory conditions and to show the noninterference of
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 624.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 625.
50. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and Stewartjoined the Burger opinion for the Court. Justice White concurred in a
separate opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion and Douglas,
joined by Marshall and Black, filed a dissenting opinion. See also Whelan,
School Aid Decisions, 125 AMERICA 8 (no. 1, July 10, 1971).
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religious affiliations with the performance of secular educational
functions. The court held that the Higher Education Act author-
ized grants to church-related colleges and universities and sustained
the constitutionality of the act. 51
The Supreme Court agreed with the three-judge court that
church-related colleges and universities could receive funds under
the Act, stating that this conclusion was fully supported by the leg-
islative history of the Act.52 Burger employed the secular pur-
pose, primary effect, excessive entanglement, and free exercise tests
as guidelines to examine the constitutionality of the Act. 3 The
Court maintained that it fulfilled a legitimate secular objective and
that its principal or primary effect did not advance religion.54
The colleges and universities did not violate the statutory restric-
tions, since there had been no religious services or worship in the
federally financed facilities, they had been used solely for nonreli-
gious purposes, and there were no religious symbols or plaques in
or on them.5 5 The Court also noted that religiosity did not per-
meate the secular education of the colleges and universities. The
teachers adhered to their concepts of professional standards and to
the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter of their
particular courses. The schools were characterized by an atmos-
phere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination.56
Burger's examination of the presence of excessive entanglement
both recognized excessive entanglement as an "independent measure
of constitutionality under the Religion Clauses"57 and contrasted the
degrees of entanglement in Lemon and Tilton. The Chief Justice
stated that three factors substantially diminished the extent and
potential danger of entanglement in Tilton. First, there was less
danger in colleges and universities than in sectarian elementary and
51. 403 U.S. at 675-76.
52. Id. at 676-77.
53. Id. at 678.
54. Id. at 679.
55. Id. at 680.
56. Id. at 681-82. Burger also suggested at 682 that ad hoc adjudication
with respect to individual colleges would be necessary to see whether or
not colleges were too sectarian to fall under the Tilton rationale. See also
Kauper, Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon,
Di Censo, and Tilton Cases, 13 ARiz. L. REV. 597, 592-93 (1971).
57. 403 U.S. at 685.
secondary schools dealing with impressionable children that reli-
gion would permeate the area of secular education, since religious
indoctrination and proselytizing were not substantial purposes or ac-
tivities at church-related colleges. This reduced the need for inten-
sive government surveillance of higher education.5 Second, the
entanglement between church and state was lessened in higher ed-
ucation by the nonideological, secular, and neutral character of the
aid provided by the government.5" Third, government entangle-
ments with religion were reduced at the level of higher education
because the federal government's aid was a one-time, single-purpose
construction grant. No continuing financial relationships were
present. Inspection as to use was a minimal contact.8 0  Cumula-
tively, these factors shaped a narrow and limited relationship with
government which involved fewer and less significant contacts than
were involved in Lemon and Di Censo. Cumulatively, these factors
substantially lessened the possibility of political divisiveness, since
the "essentially local problems" of elementary and secondary
schools were "significantly less with respect to a college or univer-
sity whose student constituency" was "not local but diverse and
widely dispersed."61 The Court quickly disposed of the free exer-
cise question by stating that no violation of the free exercise of reli-
gion existed in Tilton because the applicants were unable to show
any coercion aimed at the practice of their religious beliefs. 62
58. Id. at 685-87. Also, in note 2, at 685, Burger again cites Paul
Freund as a source for his argument. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1691 (1969), states the following: "Insti-
tutions of higher learning present quite a different question, mainly be-
cause church support is less likely to involve indoctrination and conform-
ity at that level of instruction."
59. 403 U.S. at 687-88.
60. Id. at 688. Justice White's dissenting opinion in Di Censo and his
concurring opinion in Tilton, 403 U.S. at 668, notes that he cannot under-
stand why the Court could declare that excessive entanglement existed in
Di Censo and not in Tilton. Both involved situations where teachers of
secular subjects were not to indulge in religious teaching. Both involved
continuing enforcement procedures. Clerics on the college level weren't
necessarily more reliable in keeping promises than their counterparts on
elementary and secondary levels. White approved the Tilton decision and
would have upheld Di Censo on the grounds of his decision in Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
61. 403 U.S. at 688-89. See also Note, Excessive Entanglement: A New
Dimension to the Parochial Aid Controversy Under the First Amendment,
3 LOYOLA U. CHi. L.J. 73, 86-87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Entanglement];
Pfeffer, Uneasy Trinity: Church, State, and Constitution, 2 CIv. LIB. REV.
138, 159 (1975); Kauper, Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Church Col-
leges: The Lemon, Di Censo, and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 567, 587,
589 (1971).
62. 403 U.S. at 689.
[VOL. 3: 279, 1976] Church-State Relationship
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Lemon and Tilton suggest several features and considerations re-
specting the excessive entanglement test. First, Burger fully rec-
ognized the test as an independent measure of constitutionality un-
der the Religion Clauses. The test was applied as the dominant
consideration in Lemon and the paramount consideration in Tilton.
The use of excessive entanglement as an independent concept raises
a number of questions. Was the Court's use of excessive entangle-
ment in Lemon an effort to scramble back from going beyond the
verge of constitutionality in Allen and to seize this test, recently
enunciated in Walz, as a basis for its decision?63 Is it a vague
standard because the line between permissible and impermissible
government entanglement can not be adequately described? 64 Can
the entanglement test be anything more than a guide to determine
the effect of a statute? Should the constitutionality of a statute
turn on entanglement alone? 5 Can a reasonable argument be
made that all of the tripartite tests discuss substantially the same
factors, merely utilizing different terms?66 Should the excessive
entanglement doctrine be used for anything more than examining
the duration and intimacy of supervisory contacts between govern-
ment and religious agencies? 7 Did the Court turn to the excessive
entanglement concept because the secular purpose and primary ef-
fect tests were not well suited to resolve the free exercise aspects
of the issues confronting it?1'8 Did the decision subordinate the
neutrality doctrine 9 to excessive entanglement, in that a state con-
63. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of
Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REv. 147, 148 (1972).
64. See Assistance, at 122-23; and Entanglement, supra at 93.
65. See Note, Lemon v. Kurtzman: First Amendment Religion Clauses
Reexamined, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 330, 339 (1971); Note, Financial Aid for
Nonpublic Education: A Decision for the Courts or Legislature? 49 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 366, 372 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Financial Aid]; Note,
Constitutional Law-State Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary
Schools Held Violative of Establishment Clause of First Amendment-Fed-
eral Statute Authorizing Construction Grants to Nonpublic Colleges and
Universities Held Constitutional, 17 VILL. L. REV. 574, 581 (1972).
66. See L. PFEFPER, supra note 27, at 39.
67. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Adminis-
trative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1188 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Establishment Clause].
68. See Giannella, Lemon and Tiltton: The Bitter and the Sweet of
Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REV. 147, 156-57 (1972). See also
Establishment Clause, supra at 1186.
69. See P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrUTION, 64-67 (1964); H.
ABRAHAM, supra at 257-62.
ceivably could grant direct aid to all private schools at the ele-
mentary and secondary school levels except parochial schools ?70
Did Burger, in effect, trap the states of Rhode Island and Pennsyl-
vania between the primary effect and excessive entanglement tests
in Lemon and Di Censo? If the states were to avoid advancing re-
ligion, they must inspect parochial schools to make certain that
state funds were used only for secular ends; however, if they con-
ducted such inspections, they would be causing excessive entangle-
ment of government with religion. 71 Did the Court's application
of the excessive entanglement standard in Lemon in terms of a
''cumulative impact" imply that the relationship that the fostered
by the legislation at issue consisted of elements sufficient to invali-
date it in the aggregate but perhaps not individually? 72
Second, the Court also defined excessive entanglement in terms
of "political divisiveness" 73 as a broader element of entanglement.
The Court noted that considerable political activity would occur in
communities in which large numbers of pupils were served by
church-related schools. State legislative debates, lobbying efforts,
and electoral campaigns would be marked by conflicts over aid to
church-related schools, especially if annual appropriations for ex-
isting or potential programs were under consideration. Closely
linked to political divisiveness was the "progression" argument,.
which the Court introduced in Walz. The argument was not signifi-
cant in Walz because of the long existence of tax exemptions. The
Court did find the argument more persuasive in Lemon, noting that
the newness of the program and the absence of historical experience
under the program could lay a basis for the eventual establishment
of religion, due to the "self-perpetuating and self-expanding pro-
pensities" of modern governmental programs.74
70. See Kauper, Public Aid to Parochial Schools and Church Colleges:
The Lemon, Di Censo and Tilton Cases, 13 Aniz. L. REV. 567, 582-83 (1971).
71. See Kelley, Tax Credits and the Tests of Establishment: Are Tax
Credits for the Parents of Parochial School Students Unconstitutional? 90
CHRISTIAN CENTUY 1024 (Oct. 17, 1973).
72. See Note, Educational Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon Tree, 24
STAN. L. REV. 687, 697 (1972).
73. For a discussion of the divisiveness issue before its actual use in
Lemon, see Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260, 273 (1968). Choper suggests that church
groups are frequently on opposing sides on church-state issues and that
political ruptures might intensify as parents of parochial school children
object to increased aid to public schools, since this raises their taxes with-
out direct personal benefit, decreases their ability to financially support
parochial schools, and hampers parochial schools in their efforts to main-
tain qualitative parity with improved public schools.
74. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
[VOL. 3: 279, 1976] Church-State Relationship
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Third, the Court used three criteria as bases to determine entan-
glement: (1) the character and purposes of the institutions which
were benefited, (2) the nature of the aid provided by the state, and
(3) the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority.75 These criteria were crucial in ascertaining the degree
of excessive governmental entanglement in Lemon, Di Censo and
Tilton. The Court used the "permeation" or "degree of religiosity"
argument to determine the character and purposes of the elemen-
tary and secondary schools and the colleges and universities. In or-
der to differentiate the nature of the aid, the Court examined the
degree of secularity and neutrality of the aid given by the state to
schools. The durability and intimacy of the financial relationships
were crucial matters in assessing the resulting relationships be-
tween church-related schools and the state. In essence, the Court
appeared to stress the following as key determinations:
Direct forms of state aid to sectarian education institutions are
constitutionally permissible provided that three precedent condi-
tions are satisfied: (a) the primary mission of the school is secu-
lar education rather than religious training; (b) the aid given
possesses inherent religious neutrality easily ascertainable and
controlled; and (c) such aid does not require complex regulatory
and auditing procedures on a perpetual basis.76
Fourth, the use of the three Lemon criteria demonstrate again
that excessive entanglement turns largely on matters of degree,
raising significant questions of precise definition.77 "The question
is no longer whether the state may involve itself with religion," but
of "only to what degree may its entanglement extend.17 8
Fifth, the administrative entanglements discussed in Lemon can
be separated into active and potential involvement. Active involve-
ment applies to the actual supervision which the state program pro-
vided. Potential government involvement with church-related in-
stitutions in assuring compliance with the Establishment Clause was
75. Id. at 615.
76. Comment, Parochial School Aid-From Allen to Lemon to Tilton-
Out at Second, Safe at First, 3 SEToN HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (1971).
77. See Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of
Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REV. 147, 171 (1972). See also
Comment, Constitutional Law: Establishment of Religion Clause-Display
of Religious Symbolism Upon Public Lands Restricted Through Excessive
Entanglement, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 815, 821 (1974).
78. Mott & Edelstein, Church, State, and Education-The Supreme
Court and its Critics, 2 J. LAW & ED. 591 (1973).
a significant consideration in Lemon, even though the necessary
surveillance was not included in or contemplated by the Pennsyl-
vania statute that granted direct subsidies to the elementary and
secondary schools. The reason for the Court's selection of potential
involvement to invalidate the Pennsylvania statute may be related
to the Court's desire to further develop the entanglement concept
or its inability to determine whether aid had been diverted to reli-
gious purposes.79
Sixth, the Lemon and Di Censo cases introduced the tripartite
test.80 Various persons have commented on these bases for as-
sessing permissible and impermissible church-state relations. One
commentator has stated that the tests may have created a paradox-
ical constitutional requirement. State statutes attempting to pro-
vide a primarily secular effect may at the same time create exces-
sive entanglement of government and religion. Conversely, laws
drafted to avoid an unconstitutional degree of state involvement
with religion may effectuate a primarily religious purpose.81 An-
other notes that "it is doubtful the three-pronged test descended
from Schempp and Walz will be changed. These are sound stand-
ards which protect the full interest of both church and state." The
commentator stresses that free exercise rights must be re-empha-
sized when the Court "seeks to ascertain the secular purpose, pri-
mary effect, and entanglement standards essentially created as es-
tablishment clause criteria. '8 2 Still another writer states that the
conceptual underpinnings and operations of these tests are far from
ideal, but that the tests provide a useful analytical framework for
systematic scrutiny of government aid to religions.8 3 Finally, one
of the lawyers for Jewish Day School, appellant in Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Public Education and eligious Liberty,8 4 asserts the
following:
The constitutional task is almost ministerial. Poke the local law
with thre6 probes, and only if the answers are, respectively, yes
(Is there a secular legislative purpose?), no (Does it have a pri-
mary effect to advance religion?), and no (Does the statute create
79. See Comment, The Sacred Wall Revisited-The Constitutionality
of State Aid to Nonpublic Education Following Lemon v. Kurtzman and
Tilton v. Richardson, 67 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 118, 121-22 n.20 (1972).
80. The test was also used in Tilton, but it was augmented by a fourth
test inquiring whether the federal act violated the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment.
81. Comment, Constitutional Law: State Aid to Parochial Schools-
Excessive Entanglement. Revisited, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 378, 383 (1972).
82. Financial Aid, at 383.
83. Establishment Clause, at 1201-02.
84. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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excessive government entanglement?) does the statute "pass con-
stitutional muster. '8 5
Although varying viewpoints may be presented concerning the tri-
partite tests, their significance was demonstrated through verbal
references and actual application in church-state cases considered
by the Supreme Court in 1973 and 1975. Chief Justice Burger re-
ferred to them as "guidelines" in Tilton.8 6 As long as the three
prongs of the tripartite test do not stand as ends in themselves and
as long as they "effectuate what the Court perceives to be the heart
of the Establishment Clause, that is, protection against sponsorship
by and active involvement of the state in religious activities, '87 the
tests may be useful guidelines for assessing acceptable and unaccept-
able interrelationships between church and state.
In summary, the Lemon, Di Censo and Tilton cases loosely out-
lined some features of the excessive entanglement doctrine, intro-
duced the permeation argument and the tripartite test, specifically
applied the excessive entanglement standard, distinguished higher
from lower educational facilities in terms of legitimate and illegiti-
mate direct aid to church-related institutions, and demonstrated
that the "wall of separation" was not "high and impregnable,"8 8 but
was a slightly less "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depend-
ing on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."8 9 The
1973 cases of the Supreme Court made the wall somewhat more vis-
ible.
IV. THE 1973 CHURCH-STATE CASES
The 1973 church-state opinions were Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon
II),90 Levitt v. Committeee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty (PEARL), 91 Hunt v. McNair,92 PEARL v. Nyquist,93 and
85. Lewin, Disentangling Myth from Reality, 3 J. LAW & ED. 107, 108
(1974).
86. 403 U.S. at 678.
87. Perspective, at 133.
88. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
89. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also Note, Con-
stitutional Law: State Aid to Nonpublic Schools: The Lemon Test, 25
ARK. L. REV. 535, 538-40 (1972).
90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
91. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
92. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
93. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Sloan v. Lemon. 4 Although the excessive entanglement factor did
not take a prominent role in most of these cases, they are especially
important because they represent the heightening of the wall of
separation between church and state, the Court's increasing re-
trenchment toward the "no aid" dictum of Everson, Chief Justice
Burger's increasing alienation from the Court's hardening line re-
specting public aid to sectarian schools, the significance of the pri-
mary effect test in at least three of the cases, the retention of the
tripartite test, and the reaffirmation of the Tilton distinction be-
tween aid given to higher and lower sectarian educational facilities.
Lemon II concerned a challenge to the actions of the three-judge
federal court to which Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon 1)15 had been
remanded. The federal court permitted sectarian schools to receive
payments for services rendered before the Supreme Court decision
in Lemon I, but enjoined any payments for services rendered there-
after. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in a five to
three decision, held that the schools could receive the funds that
were owed them before the Pennsylvania statute was declared un-
constitutional. 6 The Court stated that "statutory or even judge-
made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in mak-
ing decisions and in shaping their conduct." Unconstitutional stat-
utes are not absolutely and retroactively void.97 Further, the
Court held that the single and final post-audit would not present
a risk of "significant intrusive administrative entanglement" and
that the very process of oversight assured that state funds would
not be used for sectarian purposes.98 In summation, the Court
maintained that the District Court's action was legitimate and that
state officials and those with whom they deal were "entitled to rely
on a presumptively valid state statute, enacted in good faith and
by no means plainly unlawful."99
While Lemon II resolved old business for the Court, Levitt v.
PEARL introduced the question whether public funds could be used
to directly reimburse nonpublic schools for the costs of carrying out
mandated state services. Chapter 138 of New York Laws of 1970
permitted the state to reimburse nonpublic schools for performing
state-mandated services such as administering, grading, compiling,
and reporting the results of both state-prepared and teacher-pre-
94. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
95. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
96. 411 U.S. at 193-94.
97. Id. at 198-99.
98. Id. at 202-03.
99. Id. at 208-09. See also Morgan, The Establishment Clause and
Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment? 193 S. CT. REv. 57, 70 (1974).
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pared examinations, administering and reporting pupil enrollment
data, and maintaining pupil health records. The New York legisla-
ture in 1970 appropriated $28 million for reimbursement purposes.
While the money could not be used for religious instruction, sec-
tarian schools could receive money under this law. They were not
required to account for the money received, submit to state audits
of financial records, or return reimbursements exceeding actual ex-
penses.1 00 The state legislature hoped in this manner to circum-
vent any possible grounds for entanglements between parochial
schools and New York state. The three-judge federal court that
heard the challenge to this law permanently enjoined enforcement
of the Act.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in an eight to one
decision, held that the law constituted an impermissible aid to reli-
gion because no attempt was made or could be made to assure that
internally teacher-prepared tests were free from religious instruc-
tion. Aid devoted to secular functions could not be separated from
aid to sectarian activities.10 1 The Act fell on primary effect
grounds, though an entanglement issue could be implied from Bur-
ger's discussion in Levitt of Lemon I and his statement that the "po-
tential for conflict 'inheres in the situation'."'1 2 The potential for
impermissible administrative and political entanglement was great
if the state carried out its constitutional compulsion "to assure that
state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrina-
tion.' 1° Burger also held that the Court had to reject the conten-
tion that the state should be allowed to pay for any activity man-
dated by state law or regulations. One essential question in these
situations was "whether the challenged state aid has the primary
purpose or effect of advancing religion or religious education or
whether it leads to excessive entanglement by the State in the af-
100. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Lib., 413 U.S. at 474-78.
101. Id. at 479-80.
102. Id. at 480.
103. Id. See also Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian
Schools: A Final Installment? 1973 S. CT. REv. 57, 72-73 (1974); Pfeffer,
Uneasy Trinity: Church, State and Constitution, 2 CIT. LIB. REV. 138, 157
(1975); Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back
to Everson? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107, 118 (1974); Note, State Aid to
Private Schools: Reinforcing the Wall Of Supervision, 38 ALBANY L. REV.
611, 618 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Aid].
fairs of the religious institution."' 0 4 Burger did leave the door
open for states granting aid directly to parochial schools for clearly
identifiable secular purposes, provided it was separable from aid
to sectarian activities. 05 For example, aid for administation of
Regents' and state-prepared examinations might be acceptable
whereas aid for internally teacher-prepared exams would not
be. 06
While Levitt v. PEARL hinted that states might constitutionally
give direct aid to parochial schools for some state mandated serv-
ices, provided the aid concerned secular activities, Hunt v. Mc-
Nair'07 followed the arguments in Tilton v. Richardson'08 and up-
held direct state aid to a church-related college. The Hunt case
challenged the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act
as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
insofar as it authorized a proposed financial transaction involving
the issuance of tax free revenue bonds for the Baptist College of
Charleston. The Act allowed the Educational Facilities Authority
to assist colleges and universities to construct, finance, and refi-
nance projects of varying sorts so long as no assistance was granted
to facilities used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or di-
vinity schools or departments. Any lease agreement between the
Authority and a college had to include a restriction against use of
the funds for sectarian purposes. In order to insure that the agree-
ment was honored, each lease allowed the Authority to conduct in-
spections.109 Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of
South Carolina upheld the act and the proposed aid to Baptist Col-
lege.
Associate Justice Powell, speaking for a six to three majority,
utilized the components of the tripartite test as "helpful sign-
posts" 10 to affirm the constitutionality of the statute and the pro-
posed transaction. First, Powell accepted the state legislature's
declaration of purpose as manifesting a secular legislative pur-
pose."' Second, in order to identify the primary effect of the legis-
104. 413 U.S. at 481.
105. Id. at 482. Burger said that it was a "legislative not a judicial
function" to determine "actual costs incurred in performing reimbursable
secular services."
106. See Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause:
Back to Everson? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107, 119 (1974); and Morgan,
The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment?
1973 S. CT. REV. 57, 73 (1974).
107. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
108. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
109. 413 U.S. at 736-40.
110. Id. at 741.
111. Id. at 741-42.
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lation, the Court considered only the transaction between the Au-
thority and Baptist College. Powell noted that Baptist College was
not pervasively sectarian in that there were no religious qualifica-
tions for either faculty or the student body and only sixty per cent
of the College student body was Baptist, a percentage roughly
equivalent to the proportion of Baptists in that part of South Caro-
lina. The fact that the proposed lease agreement between the Au-
thority and Baptist College included a religious exclusion clause
and periodic inspections to enforce the agreement convinced the
Court majority that the proposal would not have the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion." 2
Third, Powell examined the question of entanglement. The ap-
pellant and Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, urged that
periodic inspections, the continuing financial relationships and an-
nual audits required by the act, and government analysis presented
the very kind of excessive entanglements that were lacking in Til-
ton."3 Powell agreed that the Authority's powers were sweeping
under the statute; however, his examination of the proposed lease
agreement convinced him that the college would continue to have
the responsibility for making the detailed decisions regarding the
government of the campus and the fees to be charged for specific
services. Neither the Authority nor a trustee bank could take any
action until the college failed or refused to make its rental pay-
ments. The Court concluded that excessive entanglement did not
arise from this transaction." 4
Two other "church-state" decisions were reported on the same
day as Levitt and Hunt. PEARL v. Nyquist"n was the most exten-
sive and important church-state decision in 1973 while Sloan v.
Lemon' 16 concerned the latest effort of the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture to aid church-related schools. Although excessive entangle-
ment did not constitute a significant test in either case, the further
112. Id. at 742-45.
113. Id. at 752-55.
114. Id. at 747-49. See also Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Estab-
lishment Clause: Back to Everson? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107, 118-20
(1974); State Aid, at 618-19; Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sec-
tarian Schools: A Final Installment, 1973 S. CT. REv. 57, 84-85 (1974).
115. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
116. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
development of the primary effect element of the tripartite test
justifies examination of these two cases.
In May, 1972, the Governor of New York signed into law several
amendments to the state's Education and Tax Laws. The first five
sections established three distinct financial aid programs for non-
public elementary and secondary schools. These were challenged
almost as soon as they were signed, culminating in the Supreme
Court decision known as PEARL v. Nyquist. The first section of
the challenged enactment provided for direct money grants to qual-
ified nonpublic schools to be used for the maintenance and repair
of school facilities and equipment to insure the health, safety, and
welfare of enrolled pupils. A "qualifying school" was any non-pub-
lic, non-profit elementary and secondary school that had served a
high concentration of pupils from low-income families during the
immediately preceding year. Such schools were entitled to receive
a grant of $30 per pupil per year, or $40 per pupil if the facilities
were more than 25 years old. Grants were not to exceed 50 per cent
of the average per-pupil cost for equivalent maintenance repair
services in the public schools.117
Section 2 of the challenged legislation established a tuition reim-
bursement for parents of children attending elementary and sec-
ondary nonpublic schools. Only parents with an annual taxable in-
come of less than $5000 qualified under this section. The amount
of reimbursement was limited to $50 for each grade school child and
$100 for each high school child. State reimbursements could not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the total tuition bill. No restrictions were placed
on the use of the funds by the parents.118
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the challenged legislation were designed
to provide tax relief for parents who failed to qualify for tuition
reimbursements because their incomes exceeded $5000. Under
these sections parents whose incomes ranged between $5000 and
$25000 could subtract from their adjusted gross incomes for state
income tax purposes a designated amount for each dependent for
whom they paid at least $50 in nonpublic school tuition. This de-
duction was unrelated to the amount that the taxpayer actually
paid for nonpublic school tuition.119
The federal district court invalidated Sections 1 and 2, but not
Sections 3, 4, and 5. The Supreme Court affirmed the invalidations,
117. 413 U.S. at 761-63.
118. Id. at 764.
119. Id. at 765-66.
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but overturned the District Court's decision on Sections 3, 4, and
5.
The Court divided six to three. Justice Powell, speaking for the
majority, briefly reviewed the subjects of the Establishment Clause
cases and stated that the tripartite test provided the basic criteria
for determining whether the New York laws passed "muster" under
the Establishment Clause. The Court quickly disposed of the secu-
lar legislative purpose test, holding that each challenged section was
adequately supported by legitimate, non-sectarian state interest.120
In considering the constitutionality of the maintenance and repair
grants, the Court asserted that no attempt was made in the statute
to restrict reimbursement to expenditures related to the mainten-
ance of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes and that
nothing in the statute would bar a qualifying school from using
state funds to pay the salaries of employees who maintained the
school chapel or to pay the costs of renovating classrooms in which
religion was taught.121 Further secularity of state aid was not guar-
anteed by limiting the grants to 50 per cent of the amount spent
for comparable services in public schools. The religious mission of
sectarian schools could still be furthered through these unrestricted
grants. 122 Powell held that "it simply cannot be denied that this
section has a primary effect that advances religion in that it subsi-
dizes directly the religious activities of sectarian elementary and
secondary schools.""12  Since these grants fell on the basis of the
primary effect test, the Court didn't consider the entanglement as-
pect of the tripartite test. It did leave the implication that these
provisions could fail the administrative entanglement test because
assuring the secular use of all funds required too "intrusive and
continuing a relationship between Church and State.' '1 24
The Court held that the New York tuition reimbursement also
failed the "effect" test for virtually the same reasons as did the
120. Id. at 773.
121. Id. at 774.
122. Id. at 777-78.
123. Id. at 774.
124. Id. at 780. See also State Aid, at 621-22; Financial Aid, at 374;
Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Ever-
son? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107, 113 (1974); Comment, Aid to Parochial
Schools: A Lid on the Public Coffer, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 56, 72-73 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Schools].
maintenance and repair grants. Justice Powell noted that direct
aid to sectarian schools would be invalid in whatever form.125 The
controlling question for the Court was whether the fact that the
grants were delivered to the parents rather than to the schools was
of such significance as to compel a contrary result. The Court an-
swered the question by stating that the precise function of the New
York law was to provide assistance to private schools, the great ma-
jority of which were sectarian. Partial tuition reimbursements for
parents were a means of sufficiently relieving their financial bur-
dens to assure that they would continue to have the option to send
their children to parochial schools. The Court said that the effect
of the aid was "unmistakably to provide desired financial support
for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.' 12 In answer to the state's ar-
gument that its program of tuition grants should survive because
it was designed to promote the free exercise of religion, Powell
stated that the Court had repeatedly recognized the tension be-
tween the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and that it
might not be possible to promote the former without offending the
latter. He went further, stating as follows:
As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to main-
tain an attitude of "neutrality," neither "advancing" nor "inhibit-
ing" religion. In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the
poor to choose between public and nonpublic education, the State
has taken a step that can only be regarded as one "advancing"
religion.127
The Court through this holding maintained that neutrality occa-
sionally necessitates the subordination of Free Exercise considera-
tions to Establishment Clause matters.
The invalidation of the tuition reimbursement program in Ny-
quist laid the basis for voiding the Pennsylvania tuition reim-
bursement program presented to the Court in Sloan v. Lemon.128
The Court found no constitutionally significant difference between
two programs. Qualified parents in Pennsylvania were to re-
ceive $75 for each elementary school child and $150 for each second-
ary school dependent, unless that amount exceeded the amount of
tuition paid. 29 The Court stated that it was required to look at
the substance of programs; no matter how the program was charac-
terized, the state had singled out a special class of citizens for an
economic benefit. At bottom the intended consequence of the stat-
125. 413 U.S. at 780.
126. Id. at 781-83.
127. Id. at 788.
128. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
129. Id. at 828.
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ute was to preserve and support religious oriented institutions. The
tuition grant scheme, therefore, violated the constitutional mandate
against the "sponsorship" or "financial support" of religion or reli-
gious institutions. 130
The third New York aid program provided a system of income tax
benefits for parents of nonpublic school children whose incomes
ranged between $5000 and $25000. The Court saw little practical
difficulty for purposes of determining whether this aid program ad-
vanced religion, between the tax benefit and the tuition reimburse-
ment. The qualifying parent under either program received the
same kind of encouragement and reward for sending his children
to nonpublic schools. The key difference was that one parent re-
ceived an actual cash reimbursement while the other could reduce
by an arbitrary amount the sum he would otherwise be obliged to
pay in taxes to New York. The Court rejected the contention that
aid was given to parents rather than schools for the same reasons
advanced in the tuition reimbursement sections of Nyquist'3' and
Sloan. The Court also refused to accept the appellees' contentions
that the Walz case' 3 2 provided a controlling analogy for this case,
especially in the sense that the tax exemption lessened involvement
and entanglement between church and state. Powell asserted that
the granting of tax benefits to parents of nonpublic school children
would tend to increase rather than limit the involvement between
church and state. The Court held that neither the tax benefit nor
the tuition reimbursement program was "sufficiently restricted to
assure" that it would "not have the impermissible effect of advanc-
ing the sectarian activities of religious schools.' ' 33
Although Powell did not consider whether the New York and
Pennsylvania aid programs violated the excessive entanglement
test, he did state that assistance of the sort involved in Nyquist car-
ried "grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of con-
130. Id. at 832-33. See also State Aid, at 619-20; and Financial Aid, at
375-76.
131. 413 U.S. at 791-92.
132. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
133. 413 U.S. 792-94. See also Financial Aid, at 376-77; Kauper, The
Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson? 25 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 107, 116-17; Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sec-
tarian Schools: A Final Installment? 1973 S. CT. REV. 57, 79-80 (1974).
tinuing political strife over aid to religion."' 3 4 Potentially divisive
political strife could have occurred because of the annual appropria-
tions necessary for the maintenance grants and the tuition reim-
bursements. The tax relief provisions didn't require annual reex-
amination, but the pressure for frequent expansion of the benefits
was predictable.135
The Nyquist case was marked by the appearance of a strongly dis-
senting trio of accommodationist Justices rather than the single
voice of Justice White. White was joined by Justice Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger. Burger, the author of excessive entangle-
ment and the first Justice to use the tripartite test, was incensed
because the Court ignored Everson and Allen and invalidated gen-
eral welfare programs of aid to individuals. For Burger the tuition
reimbursement and tax relief programs were general welfare pro-
grams of government aid to individuals which generally stood "on
an entirely different footing from direct aid to religious institu-
tions."'11 6 He further asserted that it was "no more than simple
equity to grant partial relief to parents who support the public
schools they do not use."'3 7 The Nyquist and Sloan dissenters con-
tinued their disenchantment with the Court's hardened line toward
public aid to sectarian schools in Meek v. Pittenger.88
In summary, the cases demonstrated the following. Lemon II
resolved a problem stemming from the Court's earlier excessive
entanglement decision in Lemon I. Hunt v. McNair applied the
tripartite test and reaffirmed the Court's acceptance, though on a
case-by-case basis, of direct governmental aid for church-related
higher as opposed to elementary and secondary educational facili-
ties. Levitt demonstrated that open-ended direct aid programs for
church-related elementary and secondary schools could run counter
to the primary effect test.
Nyquist and Sloan, especially the former, illustrated several mat-
ters. First, although the Court did not apply the excessive entan-
glement test, it asserted its validity through references to the tri-
partite test and to the broader possibilities of political divisiveness.
Second, the Court placed dominant reliance on the primary effect
test. For one thing, this may show that while the Court finds the
traditional purpose test no longer useful, Nyquist and Sloan may
be re-introducing effective scrutiny of legislative intent by way of
134. 413 U.S. at 794.
135. Id. at 796-97.
136. Id. at 799-801.
137. Id. at 803.
138. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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the effect test.13 9 These cases may also be demonstrating that the
primary effect test may be undergoing a significant reformulation
from a primary effect that neither "advances nor inhibits religion"
to require that aid not have "the direct and immediate effect of ad-
vancing religion.' 140 This may mean that the new criterion ex-
tends effect inquiry beyond primary effect to secondary effects of
a broad and immediate nature. Powell also stated that the main-
tenance and repair grants and the tax benefits had the "inevitable'
effect" of aiding and advancing religious institutions.141 The use of
terms like "direct and immediate effect" and "inevitable effect" sig-
nifies greater hardening of the line against state aid to sectarian
schools and a shoring up of the "no aid to religion" limitation found
in Everson. 42 Further, Paul Kauper noted that the Court used
"neutrality" in Nyquist in a much more ambiguous way than Kur-
land and Katz to restate the idea that the government can do noth-
ing to support or hinder religion in the absolute, a viewpoint that
is a substantial departure from Kurland's "evenhandedness" neu-
trality and Katz's conception of "neutralizing aids.' 43 Nyquist and
Sloan did not completely cut off public aid to sectarian schools, but
they did demonstrate that the avenues of permissible aid were few
and narrow. Massive governmental assistance to sectarian elemen-
tary and secondary schools, whether direct or indirect, whatever
shape or form, would not be countenanced by the Court. Everson,
Allen, Tilton, and Walz were not overruled; rather, they were
"channeled into the confines of their own fact situations" and,
therefore, have been limited as precedents for future aid pro-
grams. 44
139. Establishment Clause, at 1180.
140. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
783-85 & n.39 (1973). See also Establishment Clause, at 1181.
141. 413 U.S. at 779, 793.
142. 330 U.S. at 15-16. See Kelley, supra note 71, at 1025-26; and
Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Ever-
son? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 107, 121 (1974).
143. See Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause:
Back to Everson? 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 107, 122 (1974); P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT,
(1962), supra note 12, at 101-02; Comment, Constitutional Law: Public
Aid to Parochial Schools Held Unconstitutional, 58 MINN. L. REv. 657, 664-
65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Public Aid].
144. See Schools, at 75; Public Aid, at 665; Rabinove, Does 'Dual Enroll-
ment' Violate the First Amendment? 3 J. LAW & ED. 129 (1974).
Nyquist, Sloan, and Levitt placed principal reliance on the pri-
mary effect test. Meek v. Pittenger145 again demonstrated that the
"Court's double-edged sword of 'effect' and 'entanglement' stand-
ards may be a way of saying that a little aid is alright, but a lot
is unconstitutional.'
146
V. MEEK V. PITTENGER
This latest case concerning public aid to nonpublic schools consti-
tuted a challenge to two 1972 acts of the Pennsylvania General As-
sembly. Act 194 authorized the provision of auxiliary services to
all children enrolled in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools
meeting Pennsylvania's compulsory attendance requirements. The
auxiliary services for exceptional, remedial, and educationally dis-
advantaged children, and other secular, neutral, and nonideological
services beneficial for nonpublic school children. The teaching and
services were to be provided by public school personnel in the non-
public schools.147
Act 195 authorized the State Secretary of Education to lend text-
books without charge to children attending nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools that met Pennsylvania's compulsory attend-
ance requirements. Only textbooks acceptable for use in the public
elementary and secondary schools could be lent to nonpublic school
children.148
Act 195 also authorized the Secretary of Education, acting in ac-
cordance with requests from nonpublic school officials, to lend di-
rectly to the nonpublic schools instructional materials and equip-
ment, useful to the education of nonpublic school children. Instruc-
tional material included periodicals, photographs, maps, charts,
sound recordings, films, and other printed and published materials
of a similar nature. Instructional equipment included projection,
recording, and laboratory equipment. 149
A three-judge federal court unanimously upheld the contitution-
ality of textbook loans, narrowly upheld auxiliary services and the
instructional materials loans, and unanimously invalidated the
loans of instructional equipment, purchased with state funds for
nonpublic schools, to the extent that the equipment could be di-
verted to religious purposes. 5 0
145. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
146. Financial Aid, at 383.
147. 421 U.S. at 352-53.
148. Id. at 353-54.
149. Id. at 354-55.
150. Id. at 356-57.
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Justice Potter Stewart spoke for the Court in this decision. He
stated that the tripartite test provided the "guidelines" with which
to identify whether Acts 194 and 195 impaired the objectives of the
Establishment Clause.151
By a six to three margin' 52 the Court began by upholding the
textbook loan provisions of Act 195. These were described as being
constitutionally indistinguishable from the New York textbook loan
program approved in Board of Education v. Allen.15 3 The finan-
cial benefit of the Pennsylvania program ran to the parents and chil-
dren-not nonpublic schools, the books were used for strictly secu-
lar purposes, and the general nature of the program benefited all
school children in Pennsylvania. 154
By an identical six to three margin' 5 5 the Court invalidated the
direct loans of instructional materials and equipment because they
had the "unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion be-
cause of the predominantly religious character of the schools bene-
fiting from the Act."'156 The Court especially noted that more than
75 per cent of the nonpublic schools that qualified for aid were
church-related or religious-affiliated educational institutions. The
massive aid was neither indirect nor incidental. 57 Although aid
was earmarked for secular purposes, the fact that it was given to
pervasively religious institutions inescapably resulted in the "direct
and substantial advancement of religious activity" and thus consti-
tuted an impermissible establishment of religion."18
151. Id. at 358.
152. Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas were dissenters.
153. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
154. 421 U.S. at 361-62.
155. Burger, White and Rehnquist were dissenters.
156. 421 U.S. at 363.
157. Id. at 364.
158. Id. at 365-66. Justice Stewart made special note that Public Funds
for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F.Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973) aff'd, 417
U.S. 961 (1974), was entitled to precedential weight for Meek, since the
Supreme Court upheld the New Jersey District Court's invalidation of a
New Jersey law providing instructional material and equipment to non-
public elementary and secondary schools. New Jersey's program did not
differ in any material respect from the loan provisions of Act 195. See
also Pfeffer, Aid to Parochial Schools: The Verge and Beyond, 3 J. LAW
& ED. 115, 117-20 (1974), for a discussion of Marburger and Pfeffer's
knowledgeable predictions how auxiliary services and other aid programs
would fare in the future.
The same six Justices who invalidated the direct loans of instruc-
,tional materials and equipment also voided the auxiliary services
provided in the nonpublic schools by public school personnel. The
Court said that the District Court erred in relying entirely on the
good faith and professionalism of the public school teachers and
counselors in church related schools to ensure that a strictly non-
ideological posture was maintained. Some sort of continuing sur-
veillance would be necessary to insure that auxiliary teachers and
counselors remained religiously neutral.159 Broader political strife
also was probable because of the recurrent nature of the appropria-
tions process. The Court held that:
[The] potential for political entanglement, together with the
administrative entanglements which would be necessary to ensure
that auxiliary services personnel remain strictly neutral and non-
ideological when functioning in church-related schools, compels
the conclusion that Act 194 violates the constitutional prohibition
against laws "respecting an establishment of religion."'160
Meek produced dissenting opinions from Justice Brennan, Chief
Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan's dissent
on the textbook loan provision was significant because he had sup-
ported the Court's decision in Board of Education v. Allen, the New
York textbook loan case. Brennan noted that Allen was decided be-
fore Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I) had "ordained that the political
divisiveness factor must be involved in the weighing process .... "-161
He stressed that the Court should have examined the political
divisiveness factor in judging the permissibility of textbook
loans and should have taken the pervasively religious nature of the
elementary and secondary schools into account when it judged the
constitutionality of textbook loans.1 62
Chief Justice Burger also wrote a strong dissent, but he had dis-
sented in the decisions invalidating the instructional materials and
equipment and, especially, the auxiliary services. Burger sharply
asserted the following:
Certainly, there is no basis in "experience and history" to con-
clude that a State attempt to provide-through the services of its
own state-selected professionals-the remedial assistance necessary
159. 421 U.S. at 367-72.
160. Id. at 372. Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the
Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 S. CT. REv. 147, 175 (1972),
served as a judicial soothsayer when he warned that the Supreme Court's
failure in Lemon I, to preserve state aid to sectarian physical education
teachers, despite a broad severability clause in the statute, probably dealt
a blow to "other auxiliary aids widely accepted as welfare benefits to
the child."
161. 421 U.S. at 378, Brennan, J., dissenting.
162. Id. at 379-385.
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for all its children poses the same potential for unnecessary admin-
istrative entanglement or divisive political confrontation which
concerned the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra. Indeed, I see
at least as much potential for divisive political debate in opposi-
tion to the crabbed attitude the Court shows in this case. 163
Burger expressed the hope that at some future date the Court
would come to "a more enlightened and tolerant view of the First
Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus eliminating
the denial of equal protection to children in church-sponsored
schools, and take a more realistic view that carefully limited aid to
children is not a step toward establishing a state religion."'1 64
Burger's strongly accommodationist views are evident in these
quotes and throughout his dissenting opinion. His accommodation-
ism should be viewed in the light of his decisions in Lemon
I, Lemon II, Tilton, and Levitt, for in each case, as in his Meek dis-
sent, an effort is made to hedge, to state that "carefully limited
aid" to children, or to parents, or to sectarian colleges is constitu-
tionally permissible.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent scored the Stewart opinion for its
"demonstration of the arbitrariness of the percentage approach to
primary effect" in striking down the loans of instructional materials
and equipment because more than 75 per cent of the non-public
schools were church-related or affiliated.165 He also noted that the
auxiliary services in Meek were different from the impermissible
factual circumstances in Lemon I in both kind and degree, for pub-
lic, not parochial school personnel carried out the auxiliary services,
and the opportunities for religious instruction were much more lim-
ited than in Lemon 1.166 He asserted that the Court had thrown "its
weight on the side of those who believe our society should be a
purely secular one.' 167
Meek v. Pittenger suggests several matters relating to church
state decisions since Walz and Lemon I. First, the tripartite test
continues to be a significant set of guidelines for the Court. The
continued usefulness of the secular purpose test may be questioned,
for the Court has rather perfunctorily examined the test and as-
163. Id. at 385-86, Burger, C.J., dissenting.
164. Id. at 387.
165. Id. at 389, Rehnquist, J., dissenting.
166. Id. at 393-94.
167. Id. at 395.
serted that statutes establishing public aid to sectarian education
met its requirements in cases after Lemon I. The primary effect
test appears to be a "direct and substantial effect" test, as it was
used in Nyquist, and is still being employed to make the wall of
separation increasingly visible and less opaque. The excessive en-
tanglement test is being employed to examine excessive administra-
tive entanglement and political divisiveness. The test still is a
means of assessing the degree of permissible or impermissible en-
tanglement in statutes providing aid for sectarian education. The
primary effect and entanglement tests provide a "two-edged sword"
to examine whether the Establishment Clause has been breached.
The danger of using the tripartite tests for their own sake still ex-
ists,6" especially if the Free Exercise Clause is subordinated to the
Establishment Clause, as it was in Nyquist. Perhaps the tripartite
test would better be a quadpartite test, as it was used in Tilton. Ex-
aminations of breaches of the Free Exercise Clause should be a part
of virtually every case pertaining to state aid to sectarian education.
Second, the Court invalidated programs in Meek that had some
similarities with past cases. Direct aid to sectarian elementary and
secondary schools was voided, as it had been in several cases since
Lemon I. Auxiliary services, however, were also banned in Meek.
These had generally been regarded as indirect aids to sectarian
schools. Nyquist and Sloan, however, in examining tax benefits
and/or tuition reimbursements, laid the foundation for voiding mat-
ters that were generally considered to be indirect aids to sectarian
schools. The pervasively sectarian nature of the elementary and
secondary schools was a prime factor in compelling the Court to ex-
amine whether aids to parents or children were permissible or im-
permissible. The future of existing or potential indirect or general
welfare aids such as public health services, shared time or dual en-
rollment programs, voucher systems, and bona fide tax deductions
is threatened by the Court's decisions in Meek, Nyquist, and Sloan,
among others.
Third, Meek demonstrated that the lineup of the Court that was
manifest in Hunt, Nyquist, and Sloan still existed. The breakdown
was still three to three to three. Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas
were super separationists, Burger, Rehnquist, and White were ac-
commodationists, and Blackmun, Stewart, and Powell remained the
moderate separationists and the swing jurists.'6 9
168. Comment, A Workable Definition of the Establishment Clause:
Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 62 GEO. L.J. 1461, 1481-82 (1974).
169. Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final
Installment? 1973 S. CT. REV. 57, 88 (1974), provided the terms describing
the blocs on the Court.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This comment comprises an effort to examine the Court in its ef-
forts to draw the line in the area of public aid to church-related
education. The primary focus of the Comment was on the devel-
opment of the excessive entanglement doctrine as an element in the
tripartite test employed by the Court to assess permissible and im-
permissible aids to sectarian education. The excessive entangle-
ment test was identified in Walz as an element in the effect test.
In Lemon I and Tilton it was fully established as an independent
measure of constitutionality under the Religion Clauses. The test
was used in conjunction with the primary effect test in Hunt v. Mc-
Nair and not employed in Levitt, Nyquist, and Sloan as an inde-
pendent test. In Meek the concept was independently used to in-
validate the auxilliary services program in Pennsylvania.
It is evident that the Court will continue to develop and use the
concept on a case by case basis. This concept has been characterized
as vague, hastily conceived, better used as an element in the effect
test, not capable of standing as an independent concept, useful for
assessing the existence of impermissible continuing and close ad-
ministrative relationships between church and state, and as a good
substitute for the secular purpose and primary effect tests. The ex-
cessive entanglement and primary effect tests comprise an impres-
sive "two-edged sword" for determining the boundaries of permis-
sible and impermissible church-state involvements. These tests
have been significant tools in setting the strongly separationist
course of the Court in recent cases involving public aid to church-
related education.
Yet, the writer cannot help but intercede with a caveat or two.
Both caveats are well stated by the late Paul Kauper, speaking
about Nyquist. The statements are as relevant for 1976 as for 1973.
The Court's opinion in Nyquist is respectable, scholarly, and
plausible. It finds support in prior utterances by the Court. But
in sweeping with a wide brush and categorically rejecting every
argument made in support of the program before it, the opinion
reveals a dogmatic and authoritarian quality which comes as a
surprise at this stage in the interpretation of the establishment
clause... 170
170. Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause: Back
to Everson? 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 107, 129 (1974).
A distressing feature of the Court's approach to the establishment
clause is its unwillingness to recognize that it does have options in
its interpretation of the establishment clause, that the results are
by no means dictated, and that policy considerations consciously or
unconsciously play a part .... The policy of the Establishment
Clause is what the Court has made it to be.171
171. Id. at 128.
